Interview : Robert Whaples by Aaron Steelman
RF: I want to ask a few questions about your 1995 article
in the Journal of Economic History, “Where Is There
Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The
Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions.” In some
areas, there is general agreement among the profession-
al economists and the professional historians polled,
while on others there is a pretty sharp division. Were you
surprised by this? 
Whaples:  I was not surprised by the differences that I
found. I was more surprised by how much agreement there
was between the two disciplines. I spent the first few years
of my career teaching in a history department, and I found
that many historians have little understanding of or appre-
ciation for how markets work. This is in contrast to
economists. Even those economists who are inclined to
believe that the government has an important role to play
in the economy still tend to think that people are rational
actors and that markets are generally efficient. So I thought
that the divergence between economic historians who were
trained principally as historians and those who were trained
principally as economists would be larger than they were. 
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Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s con-
versation with Robert Whaples. For the full interview, go to
our Web site: www.richmondfed.org
Economists are sometimes accused of being 
more interested in high theory than in explaining
real-world events. This may be correct in select
cases, but it’s questionable as a general proposi-
tion. And when it comes to economic historians,
the opposite is probably closer to the truth. 
Their research seeks to explain how and why
things developed over time, and to do so they
employ the tools not only of modern economics
but also of many related disciplines.
Economic historian Robert Whaples of Wake
Forest University is no exception. His research
on labor markets, for instance, examines the 
economic, political, social, and ideological 
factors that shape the way Americans work. 
He also has written a number of papers that
explore where there is consensus among 
economic historians and where there is 
significant disagreement.   
Whaples has received two major awards from 
the Economic History Association. In 1990, 
he was awarded the Allen Nevins Prize, given 
annually to the best doctoral dissertation in 
the field of American and Canadian economic
history, for his work on the shortening of the
workweek. And in 1999, he won the Jonathan
Hughes Prize for Excellence in Teaching
Economic History. In addition, Whaples is 
director of EH.Net, which provides extensive
online resources for economic historians 
and students. 
Aaron Steelman interviewed Whaples on the
















































RF Summer 2005 FINAL.ps - 7/12/2005 13:52 PMRF: More than half of the economists polled disagreed
with the proposition that “monetary forces were the 
primary cause of the Great Depression.” Why do you
think there is a probable disconnect on this issue between
economists who specialize in
monetary issues — most of whom
would likely answer that question
in the affirmative — and econ-
omic historians?
Whaples: My sense is that econom-
ic historians are likely to have done
more extensive reading about that
time period and the very complex
nature of the phenomenon. They
wouldn’t deny that monetary forces were very important,
but they are likely to consider all of these other things that
were going on. So it may largely be a semantic issue, with the
economic historians less likely to describe anything as the
“primary cause” of the Great Depression, because they
attribute it to a constellation of events.      
RF: Staying on the topic of the Great Depression, the
economists polled were significantly more likely than
the historians to agree that the “New Deal served to
lengthen and deepen” the economic problems of the late
1920s and the 1930s. What is your view on this question?
Whaples: First, I should say that it is a very provocative 
question, and it elicited an interesting response. The finding
was almost an even split among the economists polled. 
Forty-nine percent either agreed, or agreed with provisos,
that the New Deal “served to lengthen and deepen the Great
Depression,” while 51 percent disagreed. So there’s a large
share of economists who think that the New Deal wasn’t
such a good deal. 
Why? There are some New Deal programs that many
economic historians see as major blunders. At the top of the
list is the National Industrial Recovery Act, which cartelized
the economy just as it was getting off the ground, leading to
lower output, consumption, and employment. If you look at
the quarter-by-quarter estimates — they’re not perfect, but
they do shed some light on this time — by 1933 the economy
was starting to come back pretty rapidly. Then the NIRA
was passed, and by the last quarter of 1933, the economy
started to go down.
There are other programs that many economic historians
look at critically. They may have had some desirable effects,
but probably slowed down the recovery. One is the Wagner
Act, which led to the sit-down strikes and labor unrest.
Another is the Social Security Act, which increased the tax
burden when many people believed that a fiscal stimulus was
needed. By 1937 the economy really slowed down again, lead-
ing to what has been called the “Roosevelt recession.” So many
economic historians believe that there were a number of mis-
steps taken during the New Deal, and I would tend to agree.
RF: Following the Civil War, it took a significant amount
of time for the Southern economy to converge to
Northern levels. There have been several ideas offered to
explain why that was the case. Which explanation, or com-
bination of explanations, do you
find most convincing?
Whaples: At the time the Civil 
War began, the South was not
behind the rest of the country 
economically, but afterward, living
standards were well below those 
in the North. The question is:
Why? Many parts of the South
were decimated by the war, and the
destruction of capital certainly played a role. But this does
not explain why things took so long to turn around. The 
abolition of slavery was certainly important. Freed slaves
decided to work less and consume more leisure. Also, the
price of cotton was near an all-time high before the war but
then declined for most of the rest of the century. So that
hurt the South’s economy and is part of the story. 
My favorite interpretation of what happened following
the Civil War, and I think it’s probably the profession’s
favorite interpretation, is pretty akin to what Gavin Wright
has argued in Old South, New South. It emphasizes the 
lack of integration, especially in the labor market and also in
the capital market. 
Labor really did not come out of the South, mainly for 
cultural reasons and perhaps for some economic reasons.
Capital was less willing to come into the South, partly
because at this time you often needed to have the managers
migrating with the capital, and many were unwilling to do so.
One reason was climatic: This was before the invention of air-
conditioning. Another was cultural: We just don’t like the way
they do things down here and we’re not really well accepted.
I have stated the story in pretty crude terms, but that’s the
flavor of the argument, and I think it’s pretty persuasive.
RF: But wouldn’t we expect capital to flow to where the
returns are the highest, even if there are some cultural
institutions in the South that Northern investors find
unappealing?  
Whaples: I think that there are clearly some examples of
this. If the return on capital was high enough, it did move to
the South. Take the region around Birmingham, Ala., for
instance. There were some very good iron deposits around
that area, which made it a natural place for steel production.
The textile industry moved to the Carolinas, largely from
New England, New York, and New Jersey. But in marginal
cases, where the returns were likely to be similar to those in
the North, capital didn’t tend to flow south.
Also, I would like to make a more general point about the
economy of the post-bellum South. There are some very
important regional differences. Prior to the Civil War, the
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There are some 
New Deal programs that
many economic historians
see as major blunders.
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we are today: North Carolina. And
the richest parts were the cotton
areas near the Mississippi Delta.
Now, that situation is essentially
reversed.
RF: Nearly everyone you polled
disagreed with the proposition
that “the slave system was eco-
nomically moribund on the eve of
the Civil War.” Had the South
been permitted to secede in 1861,
how long do you think slavery
would have remained economic-
ally viable?
Whaples: This is pretty interesting.
The belief that slavery was on its
way out prior to the Civil War was widely respected and
accepted for a long time — from the end of the Civil War
until the 1950s or so. But since then, more rigorous models
have shown that the returns that slaveowners received were
pretty large. So if you are looking at it purely from an eco-
nomic standpoint, it’s hard to say that the system was
moribund.
How long would slavery have lasted had the Civil War not
occurred? I began to think about that, and all you really need
is a system in which the marginal revenue product of labor 
is high enough to cover the maintenance cost.  Aslaveowner
would have approached this question in the same way that 
he would have considered the issue of using mules and 
horses following the invention of the automobile. When the 
automobile and tractor came along, using draft animals was
no longer economically viable, and so many owners just 
let those animals go. That’s a system that is moribund. 
Would that have happened in the human system? I don’t
think so. Human beings are so much more flexible and 
adaptable that slaves could have been put to many other 
uses once the cotton industry had become mechanized and
people were no longer needed in large numbers. In fact, 
we know that before the Civil War there was a lot of indus-
trial slavery. Slaves were moved from farms to factories as
the latter became more profitable. I think that would have 
continued to be the case, with slaves being used in a variety 
of agricultural, industrial, and even service-sector jobs. 
So, economically, I think slavery could have remained
viable for a very long time after the Civil War. What would
have probably undermined the system was the reduced cost
of transportation and communication. As it became cheaper
and easier to escape from bondage, the costs of monitoring
slaves probably would have become prohibitively large.
RF: You have done a lot of work on labor issues, specif-
ically questions having to do with the length of the
workweek. When did the eight-hour day become the
norm in the United States? And
what were the principal causes
of this change?
Whaples: The best documentation
we have about the length of the
workweek comes from the manu-
facturing sector. In the mid-19th
century, the workweeks were very
long. But then they came down fairly
rapidly. By the end of World War I,
we effectively had the eight-hour
day. It wasn’t quite in the form that
we recognize today, because the
workweek was generally six days.
That stayed the norm until the
Great Depression, when a lot of
Saturday work ended. Work sched-
ules became considerably longer
during World War II. But in the main, the typical workweek
has been five eight-hour days since the 1930s. So it did come
sooner than many people think, and it did predate the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which gave us the overtime law in 1938.
My research on this topic strongly suggests that the
cause of the shorter workweek was economic growth,
which led to higher real wages. But I think we have to put
that answer into the context of the time in which it
occurred, because we have had substantial growth in real
wages since then, yet we haven’t seen the length of the
workweek go down even more. 
So what was occurring during the late 1800s and early
1900s? I think it had to do with the marginal utility of an
extra hour of leisure being incredibly high during that peri-
od. Many people were doing pretty onerous work. There
were many mind-numbing routine jobs and many jobs that
required back-breaking physical labor. But we don’t have a
great number of those jobs in our economy any longer. In
fact, a lot of us have jobs where the distinction between
work and leisure gets a little fuzzy. Well, it wasn’t fuzzy
back then, and boy, did they want those extra hours off to
relax, spend time with their families, and hang out with the
guys. So as wages got higher, they bought more of this
leisure time. Any other economic factor is so secondary to
this that I don’t even think it’s worth mentioning.
Also, I think it’s worth mentioning that although the
workweek hasn’t gotten shorter in recent years — in fact, 
for more educated and skilled workers there is some evi-
dence that it has gotten longer — the total share of a
person’s life spent working for pay has continued to fall.
People enter the labor force at later ages, they retire earlier,
and they live longer. All of these things have contributed to
more leisure consumption. 
RF: Why do you think that the South has traditionally
had a smaller share of its labor market unionized than
the North? 
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data on unionization rates from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. And it’s always a battle between North Carolina
and South Carolina for who has the lowest share.
Unionization rates have always been lower in the South
than in the rest of the country. One explanation is the nature
of the region’s economy: Agriculture has traditionally been
more important to the South, and that sector typically has
pretty low unionization rates. Going beyond that, I think
there are some important cultural factors. When unions are
really strong, there is a sense among workers that it’s us ver-
sus them, labor versus management. In the North, the
workers were often a group of immigrants, while the man-
agement was often the native-born, better-educated elite. In
the South, there was much less of that. The division was
black versus white, and culturally the white workers identi-
fied with management. So there was much less of an
us-versus-them mentality. That, I think, has a lot to do with
the relative weakness of labor unions in the South. 
RF: You have co-edited a book
titled Public Choice Interpretations
of Economic History. What insights
can public choice bring to bear on
economic history?
Whaples:  I think the best way to
answer that question may be to dis-
cuss my favorite chapter from that
book. Werner Troesken of the
University of Pittsburgh looks at the
passage of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. He analyzes what happened to
the stock prices of the big trusts at
the time. What he shows, pretty con-
vincingly, is that the value of those
companies’ stocks were rising as it
became more and more certain that
the Sherman Antitrust Act was going
to be passed. So the markets clearly
thought that the law was going to be
good for the very companies whose power, ostensibly, it was
designed to curb. That might seem pretty counterintuitive to
many, but it’s an interpretation that a public-choice econo-
mist would find pretty intuitive. 
RF: Please tell our readers a little bit about EH.Net and
your role in it.
Whaples: EH.Net grew out of the Cliometric Society. It
started as an online discussion group among members of the
Society in 1994, in the early days of the Internet. We found
that this was useful, but we wanted to make it more perma-
nent. And we thought that the way to do that was to make it
an independent organization, and one that offered a lot
more than a simple online discussion forum. So we held a
meeting in 1996, where we chartered ourselves as a new
organization, with Samuel Williamson of Miami University
as the director and myself as the associate director. Our divi-
sion of labor was the following: Sam was the fund-raiser and
principal organizer, and I focused on adding content to the
Web site.
There are several things that we offer. Perhaps the most
important is our “How Much Is That?” feature, which allows
people to obtain historical data on inflation rates, exchange
rates, economic output, the cost of labor, purchasing power,
and a number of other data series. We also have an encyclope-
dia that is aimed at students and lay readers. The entries
discuss the big issues in economic history — slavery, the Civil
War, and the Great Depression, for instance — as well as more
offbeat topics like prohibition and Major League Baseball. 
There are about 100 articles in the encyclopedia, and the
idea is to get the research that is published in the profes-
sional journals out there to the public. So much of it is holed
up in academic libraries, when we think there is a much
broader audience for it. The other
big thing we have is a book review
section. We now have reviewed
about 1,000 books over the years.
Most of them have come through
my office, and we try to be compre-
hensive in our coverage. We aim to
review everything that is published
in the core areas of economic histo-
ry, and many books that are in more
peripheral areas.
As for the organization, in 2003
the Economic History Association
became the owner of EH.Net. Also, I
became the director that year,
though Sam Williamson is still quite
active. And I’m proud to say that my
son, Thomas, who is a student at
Wake Forest, is EH.Net’s webmaster.
RF: Which economists have influ-
enced you the most?
Whaples: Probably the economist who has influenced me
the most is Gary Becker. By applying the assumption that
individuals are rational and utility-maximizing to areas once
thought beyond the scope of economics, he has helped us
better understand so many facets of life. Among economic
historians, Robert Fogel is probably the most influential.
His relentless quantification, his willingness to be so inter-
disciplinary in his work, and his extreme optimism are
things that I find extremely admirable. Closer to home, the
people on my dissertation committee — Claudia Goldin,
Robert Margo, and Paul Taubman — have been very impor-
tant to me. Also, I should note Gavin Wright and Joel
Mokyr. When I read them, I learn more about how to be an
economic historian. RF
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Robert Whaples
➤Present Position
Professor of Economics, Wake Forest
University, and Director of EH.Net
➤Previous Faculty Appointments
Department of History, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee (1988-1991)
➤Education
B.A., University of Maryland (1983); Ph.D.,
University of Pennsylvania (1990)
➤Selected Publications
Author of several articles in the Journal of
Economic History and other academic jour-
nals, and co-editor of two books, Historical
Perspectives on the American Economy (1995)
and Public Choice Interpretations of American
Economic History (1999)
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